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ABSTRACT 
 
ASHLEY KAREN TIMIDAISKI:  The Development of Poland’s Right:  from Reliance 
on Historical Rivalries to Stable Party Platforms 
(Under the direction of Dr. Milada Anna Vachudova) 
 
 Many predicted that Poland’s developing political party system would favor a 
strong right wing due to several preexisting qualities:  Poland’s less oppressive 
communist regime, the strong presence of the Catholic Church in Polish society, and the 
power of Solidarity – Poland’s exceptionally large anti-communist opposition movement.  
However Poland’s Right remained weak and fragmented for over a decade after the 
transition from communism.  This thesis posits that the weakness of Poland’s Right was 
due to their reliance on historical rivalries between the Solidarity-successor and 
Communist-successor parties as a campaign platform instead of creating a cohesive 
political ideology under unified leadership, as was exemplified by the failed right-wing 
coalition of the 1990s, Solidarity Electoral Action.  In conclusion, it was not until the 
2005 and 2007 elections, when the Right was forced to compete against each other, that 
the historical rivalry strategy was abandoned, resulting in two stable mass parties on the 
Right.
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Introduction 
 The recent political history for political parties in East Central Europe (ECE) has 
been, as one might expect, untidy:  without previously established political parties, the 
first few years after the transition from communism featured a patchwork of small, ill-
defined political parties.  These parties were often forced to forge political alliances with 
one another in order to survive, and in such an unstable system alliances were formed less 
often on ideology than on political legacy.  After the transition from communism, two 
political legacies were left:  that of the Communist party and that of the anti-communist 
opposition movement.  Once out of power, communist parties transformed (some with 
more ease than others) into left-wing1 social democratic parties, and logically any 
opposition movement was to become the Right in the state’s budding political spectrum.  
Based on this assumption, we could hypothesize that states with the strongest anti-
communist opposition movements would naturally produce the strongest right-wing 
political parties.2  In Hungary and Czech Republic a strong anti-communist opposition 
movement did, in fact, lead to a strong Right during the 1990s.   
 Poland, however, has proved a surprising exception to this prediction. Of all the 
East Central European countries, Poland initially showed the greatest signs of forming a
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper I will use the term “left-wing” and “right-wing” without any connotation that these 
are extremist far-left or far-right ideologies or parties.  Any reference to extremist ideology or political 
parties will be explicit and specific.  I will explain further in this chapter how I categorize political parties 
in Poland. 
 
2
 See Vachudova, Milada Anna.  (2008).  “Centre-right parties and political outcomes in East Central 
Europe.”  Party Politics.  14(4).  pp. 387-405 and Vachudova, Milada Anna.  (2005).  Europe undivided:  
democracy, leverage, and integration after communism.  New York:  Oxford University Press. 
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strong right wing:  during the 1980s the “Solidarity” trade union became the largest 
democratic opposition movement in any communist state and later achieved an 
overwhelming victory in the first semi-free elections in 1989.  In addition to the 
Solidarity movement, the conservative (and anti-communist) Catholic Church had long 
been prevalent in Poland’s politics – even during the communist regime.  All of these 
factors should have resulted in a strong Right in the post-communist “Third Republic” of 
Poland, but it did not.  Throughout the 1990s, Poland’s Right was plagued by infighting, 
fragmentation, and poor party management, while the communist-successor parties were 
able to maintain a strong, stable position on Poland’s Left into the 2000s.  It was not until 
the 2005 and 2007 elections that Poland’s Right was able to succeed not only at the polls, 
but also in stabilizing their party structure and platform. 
 What can account for the disunity and chaos of the Polish Right for over a decade 
after 1989?  There are several possible explanations:  feuds between the Right’s elites, 
unfavorable circumstances occurring under a Right government (such as economic crisis, 
corruption, or scandal), or the inability of Right parties to connect with voters.  All of 
these factors contributed to the weakness of Poland’s Right.  However I hypothesize that 
the most injurious aspect of Poland’s Right was its reliance on the defunct Solidarity-
successor versus communist-successor division as a defining cleavage – and the Right’s 
substitution of this historical rivalry for a comprehensive political ideology.  As a result, 
parties that were ostensibly members of the Right had widely divergent ideologies and 
platforms, making a strong, “mass party” with a broad ideological consensus impossible.3  
                                                 
3
 See Sitter, Nick.  (2002).  “Cleavages, party strategy and party system change in Europe, East and West.”  
Perspectives on European Politics and Society.  3(3).  pp. 425-451. 
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I conclude that Poland’s Right was unable to stabilize itself and succeed electorally until 
it overcame this “post-communist divide” in 20054. 
 To provide evidence for this hypothesis, I will first examine the patterns of party 
competition in Poland after 1989, analyzing key cleavages between the Left and Right.  I 
will demonstrate how the axis of competition prior to the 2005 election centered on 
vestigial issues of the post-communist divide, such as lustration, and social issues, such 
as the role of the Catholic Church in public life.  Second, I will demonstrate how reliance 
on its historic rivalry with the post-communists instead of ideology to identify itself led to 
the fragmentation and weakness of Poland’s Right during the 1990s, notably displayed by 
the failed right-wing party/coalition Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS).  Finally, I will 
demonstrate that the 2005 and 2007 elections strengthened and stabilized the Right by 
eliminating the post-communist/post-Solidarity divide as a defining cleavage. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows:  I will continue this first introductory chapter 
with a brief discussion of political ideology and party competition in ECE and Poland.  
This discussion will show how ideology is defined differently in ECE than in Western 
democracies, and how this difference leads to different patterns of party identification 
and competition.  I will also clarify how parties will be categorized on the political 
spectrum in this paper. 
 In Chapter 2 I will detail the elements of Poland’s communist past that ought to 
have favored the formation of a strong Right in the 1990s:  the greater political freedom 
experienced by Poles during communism (in comparison to citizens of other communist 
                                                 
4
 See Hanley, Sean, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton and Brigid Fowler.  (2008).  “Sticking together:  
explaining comparative centre-right party success in post-communist Central and East Europe.”  Party 
Politics.  14(4).  pp 407-434. 
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states in the region), the stalwart and active Catholic Church, and most especially the 
strong anti-communist movement Solidarity.  In the second half of this chapter I will 
demonstrate how, in spite of these elements in favor of  a strong Right, Poland’s Right 
failed to develop a cohesive party in the early 1990s and how it remained weakened and 
fragmented in 1995 as a result. 
 Next, I will examine in Chapter 3 the failure of the first large-scale attempt to 
unite the Polish Right – Solidarity Electoral Action.  I will demonstrate how the alliance 
was formed based on historical allegiances rather than ideology, and how this disunity led 
to infighting, fragmentation, and the coalition’s ultimate dissolution by 2001. 
In Chapter 4 I will demonstrate how the post-communist/post-Solidarity division 
began to wane with the 2005 elections and practically disappeared by the 2007 election.  I 
will argue that the weakness of the Left during this time forced Poland’s Right to 
compete against each other, resulting in competition based on ideology and not history, 
and ultimately the stabilization of the political platforms of right-wing parties.  
Finally, I will conclude in Chapter 5 that Poland’s Right owes its recent electoral 
success and party stabilization to their changed electoral strategy away from campaigns 
based on historical rivalry and towards campaigns based on economic and social 
cleavages. 
 
Party Competition in the West and East 
Some background on party competition and political ideology is necessary before 
I begin to discuss specifics of Poland’s party system.  It should be noted that political 
parties in ECE and Poland follow a different pattern of competition than political parties 
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in the West.  Since the Second World War, the axis of party competition in Western 
states has centered on economic issues, such as wealth redistribution, taxation, welfare, 
and the government’s role in regulating the economy.  While there are various positions 
in between, I will use the Left and Right to demonstrate how political agendas are 
generally aligned.  Usually, the Left campaigns for economic equality through increased 
government regulation, more progressive taxation, and increased government spending 
on social welfare programs.  Meanwhile, the Right usually campaigns for individual 
economic freedom through less progressive taxation (and sometimes alternate approaches 
to taxation, such as a flat tax), limited government interference in the economy, and less 
state-funded welfare programs.  It is important to note that the economic Right is often 
described as being economically “liberal”, which refers to economic liberalism’s position 
opposite socialism, and thus should not be confused with the conventional “liberal” 
versus “conservative” division.     
A second axis of competition has emerged in Western states since the 1970s – the 
socio-cultural or “new-politics” axis.  This social axis encompasses environmental issues, 
the question of religion and secularism, and of immigration and national identity.  The 
social Left is characterized by support for environmentalism, secularism, tolerance for 
alternative lifestyles (including support for same-sex marriage), and liberal immigration 
policies.  The social Right is characterized by traditionalism, support for religious values 
(including stances against abortion and same-sex marriage), and restricted immigration 
policies (often including nationalism).  Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Milada Vachudova 
and others have used the terms “GAL” (green, alternative, and libertarian) to describe the 
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social Left and “TAN” (traditionalism, authority, and nationalism) to describe the social 
Right.5    
In Western democracies, economically Left and socially Left/GAL stances are 
commonly linked in the political platforms of left-wing parties, just as economically 
Right positions are linked with socially Right/TAN stances in right-wing parties.   
Figure 1:  Ideology of West European Political Parties in 2002 
 
Source:  Vachudova and Hooghe (2008).  In addition to each party’s position on a social and economic 
axis, this figure represents each party’s position towards increased European integration. 
 
In the post-communist world this pattern was not present.  Decades of communist rule, 
which linked Left economics with TAN social policy, left behind a muddled field of 
                                                 
5
 See Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson and Erica Edwards.  (2006).  “Party  
competition and European integration in the East and West:  different structure, same causality.”  
Comparative Political Studies.  39(2). and Vachudova, Milada Anna and Liesbet Hooghe.  (2008).  
“Postcommunist politics in a magnetic field:  how transition and EU accession structure party competition 
on European integration.”  Comparative European Politics, forthcoming. 
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political competition in ECE countries in which traditional axes of competition were no 
predictor of a party’s position on either the Left or the Right.6   
Figure 2:  Ideology of Central and East European Political Parties in 2002 
 
Source:  Vachudova and Hooghe (2008). In addition to each party’s position on a social and economic axis, 
this figure represents each party’s position towards joining the European Union. 
 
In general, political parties of the West have used economic policy as the most important 
criteria for distinguishing themselves from other parties, with social issues playing a less 
important role. 7  However in post-communist ECE, where the population had become 
accustomed to socialism, economically Right parties were rare and unpopular.  As a 
result, economically Left platforms could be present in parties on both the Left and Right.  
                                                 
6
 Vachudova and Hooghe (2008) p 6.   
 
7
 There are variations on this pattern in the West.  For example, right-wing parties of Western Europe, 
particularly Christian Democratic parties, hold economic positions that are more left-wing than right-wing 
parties in the United States.  In addition, extreme right wing parties, such as Le Pen in France, typically tie 
nationalism to populism/socialism, which is typically an economically Left position. 
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Hence, social cleavages became a more accurate axis of competition.8  At least in Poland, 
an even better predictor of a party’s place on the political spectrum was its origin in either 
the communist party or the Solidarity opposition.9     
Thus, the Left and Right in Poland can be described as follows.  
Figure 3:  Ideology of Poland’s Political Parties in 2002 
 
Source:  Vachudova and Hooghe (2008).  As with previous figures, this figure also shows each party’s 
position towards European Union Accession. 
 
Poland’s mainstream moderate Left was dominated by the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD)10, which was almost entirely comprised of Poland’s reformed communist party.11  
                                                 
8
 For example, see Vachudova (2008). 
 
9
 For example, see Hanley, Sean.  (2006).  “Getting the Right right:  redefining the centre-right in post-
communist Europe.”  Centre-Right parties in post-communist East-Central Europe.  Aleks Szczerbiak and 
Sean Hanley, eds.  New York:  Routledge.  pp. 9-27. 
 
10
 See Appendix A for a list of major parties in Poland and their ideological categorization. 
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As a result, the Left generally holds a more positive attitude towards the communist past, 
most notably displayed in their opposition to strengthened lustration laws.  Like its 
Western social democratic counterparts, Poland’s Left supports economic distribution 
through progressive taxation and state-funded welfare and healthcare programs.  The Left 
opposes increased privatization of Poland’s economy (though when the SLD came to 
power in the early 1990s it did continue the economic liberalization set in motion by the 
“shock therapy” of the previous Solidarity administration), and in general has purported 
to defend the “losers” of the economic transition. In addition the Left supports 
secularization and opposes the strong role that the Catholic Church played (and still does 
play) in Poland’s public life.  Both the social and economic stances of Poland’s Left 
correspond with normal patterns of ideological affiliation found in the West, with only a 
few small parties (such as the pro-market Freedom Union (UW) or the radical socially 
conservative Self-Defense (SO) parties) diverging from the norm.  
Poland’s Right is not as easy to define.  Economic positions vary widely from the 
pro-market Civic Platform (PO) to the populist/socialist League of Polish Families 
(LPR), and social positions range from moderate conservatism (like the positions held by 
PO) to more extreme religious and nationalist positions (like those held by the Law and 
Justice party (PiS) and LPR).  For much of the 1990s, the Right defined itself primarily 
by its roots in Solidarity and opposition to communism (including support for lustration 
and decommunization) as well as religious social conservatism. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11
 Early in the 1990s, nearly all left-wing parties had roots in the reformed communist party, but a few 
historical parties such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) also placed themselves on the Left.  In the mid-
1990s and 2000s, several liberal contingents splintered from the Solidarity-successor parties to form parties 
on the Left, such as the Freedom Union (UW). 
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In conclusion, for many parties in Poland, political ideology mattered less than 
history.  For the Poland’s Left, the transition from communist party to a Western style 
social democratic party was logical.  As the official successor to the (now reformed) 
communist party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) was able to dominate the left wing 
of Poland’s political spectrum with little competition and the party enjoyed stability and 
strong support until the 2000s. 12  Solidarity, the massive opposition movement to the 
communist government, was comprised of a plethora of differing ideologies – from 
liberal secularists to conservative Catholics – with only one goal in common:  the defeat 
of communism.  As such, Solidarity’s legacy did not have such an obvious path as the 
reformed communist party.  Poland’s Right thus identified itself based on its attitude 
towards communism, and not on any coherent political ideology.  In the chapters to come 
I will demonstrate how this strategy failed not only to win elections, but also to create 
stable, broadly-based mass parties.
                                                 
12
 For more on the development of Poland’s Left in the Third Republic, see Grzymala-Busse, Anna Maria.  
(2002).  Redeeming the communist past: the regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe.  
New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
 Solidarity’s Successors 
Poland is an unusual case in the context of political party development after 
communism.  Among its peers in East Central and Eastern Europe, factors like a less-
oppressive communist regime, the large presence of a non-state institution (such as the 
Catholic Church), and a large, enduring opposition movement like Solidarity would have 
led to a strong political Right after the transition from communism.  In Poland, these 
factors did nothing to protect Poland’s Right from a crisis of leadership, a lack of a strong 
cohesive platform, and the inevitable fragmentation that prevented Poland’s Right from 
gaining votes or governing effectively.  In this chapter I will begin first by describing the 
political history that preceded the right-wing parties of Poland’s Third Republic.  I will 
emphasize the factors that favored the formation of a strong Right, such as the less 
repressive communist regime, the prevalence of the Catholic Church, and the strength of 
the anti-communist opposition movement, Solidarity.  In the second half of this chapter I 
will demonstrate how, despite these favorable elements, Poland’s Right in the early 1990s 
was unable to consolidate under a unified leadership or ideology, and how it ultimately 
disappeared from Poland’s party politics by 1995. 
 
Solidarity’s Origins 
Such a large-scale opposition movement as Solidarity was made possible by the 
precedent set by earlier anti-communist opposition.  Though Poland’s communist regime
  
 
 
12
was generally less oppressive than other communist regimes in East Central and Eastern 
Europe, the first few years of communist rule in Poland after the Second World War were 
extremely repressive politically, made especially so because of Poland’s strong resistance 
to communism and general anti-Russian sentiment.13  Stalin’s hard-fisted influence 
extended over the Soviet bloc, stamping out political opposition completely when 
possible or co-opting the more resilient opposition into the state.14  Unlike in 
Czechoslovakia or Hungary, Poland did not experience any democratic interlude between 
the war’s end and the beginning of the Communists’ rule.15   Tomas Kostelecky writes of 
these early years:  “Although the Communists did permit some features of the democratic 
system to exist (for example, parliament and local councils), the elections to these 
representative bodies were anything but normal or fair.”16  Opposition parties, where they 
existed, were usually weak and lacked cohesion.17     
However after Stalin’s death in 1953 political censorship decreased dramatically 
in Poland.  Poland was able to create its own “national” socialism, which equated to 
decreased repression of universities and the Catholic Church.  Activities in neighboring 
Hungary, as in the suppression of the 1956 revolt led by Imre Nagy, and in 
Czechoslovakia, as in the ill-fated 1968 “Prague Spring” led by Alexander Dubczek, had 
a great influence on Poland’s own political opposition, at once inspiring it to carry on but 
                                                 
13
 Mazower, Mark.  (2000).  Dark continent:  Europe’s twentieth century.  New York:  Vintage Books.  p 
258. 
 
14
 Kostelecky, Tomas. (2002). Political parties after communism: developments in East- 
Central Europe.  Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  p 29. 
 
15
 Rothschild, Joseph and Nancy M. Wingfield.  (2000).  Return to diversity:  a political  
history of East Central Europe since World War II.  Third edition.  New York:  Oxford University Press.  p 
133. 
16
 Kostelecky (2002) p 29. 
 
17
 Mazower (2000) p 260. 
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also serving it a grim reminder of the consequences of pushing the communist 
government – and its backers in Moscow – too far.18 
 Tolerance for political opposition increased with time in Poland.  In the 1970s 
Poland’s economic decline sparked many strikes and demonstrations.  While these 
protesters were persecuted vigorously, the government vocalized empty promises for 
positive change.19  These protests were the beginning of real political opposition in 
Poland, and sparked groups like the Committee for the Defense of Workers and the 
Confederation of Independent Poland.20  In addition, Poland’s substantial Catholic 
population (at one point nearly all Poles who claimed any religion at all claimed 
Catholicism) was energized by the election of the first Polish pope, John Paul II 
(formerly Cardinal Karol Jozef Wojtyla), in 1978.  John Paul II was vocal in his 
denunciation of the communist governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
though he was careful to distance the church from outright political activity, being “in the 
world but not of it.”21 The church’s influence continued to be a strong influence on 
Poland’s anti-communist opposition – especially on Solidarity.22 
 
Solidarity’s Strength as an Opposition Movement 
                                                 
18
 Rothschild and Wingfield (2000) p 152-153. 
 
19
 Kostelecky (2002) p 32. 
 
20
 Ibid. p 32-33. 
 
21
 Rothschild and Wingfield (2000) p 199. 
 
22
 For more on the Catholic Church’s role in opposition to communism, see Michnik, Adam.  (1993).  The 
Church and the Left.  Translated by David Ost, ed.  Chicago:  Chicago University Press. 
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In 1980, the famous Gdansk shipyard strikes marked the birth of Solidarity,23 a 
free trade union led by future Polish president Lech Walesa that soon became a catchall 
opposition force to the communist government.24  With almost ten million members,25 it 
encompassed liberals and conservatives alike, Catholics and atheists, intellectuals and 
laborers, and even one-third of the members of Poland’s Communist Party!26  After much 
struggle, Solidarity was actually recognized as a legal trade union by the communist 
government in 1980 – an unprecedented occurrence in the Eastern bloc.27   
The enjoyment of this success was short-lived.  The Soviet Union became aware 
of Solidarity’s growing power and allegedly threatened to intervene militarily.28  In order 
to prevent the invasion of Soviet troops, Polish Communist leader Gen. Wojciech 
Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland in 1981.29  The result was a crack-down on 
Solidarity’s activities and the arrest of their leaders – including Lech Walesa.30   
 Thankfully for the Solidarity movement, the period of martial law was relatively 
brief. The political thaw initiated by Russia’s last communist leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
increased exponentially under Gen. Jaruzelski.  Jaruzelski was one of the biggest 
                                                 
23
 See Ash, Timothy Garton.  (2002).  The Polish revolution:  Solidarity.  Third edition.  New Haven:  Yale 
University Press. 
 
24
 Kostelecky (2002) p 33. 
 
25
 Tworzecki, Hubert. (1996).  Parties and politics in post-1989 Poland.  Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press. p 49. 
 
26
 Szerbiak, Aleks (2006a).  “The Polish centre-right’s (last?) best hope:  the rise and fall of solidarity 
electoral action.”  Centre-Right parties in post-communist East-Central Europe.  Aleks Szczerbiak and 
Sean Hanley, eds.  New York:  Routledge.  p 57. 
 
27
 Tworzecki (1996) p 48. 
 
28
 Ibid. p 49-50. 
 
29
 Kostelecky (2002) p 34. 
 
30
 Tworzecki (2002) p 49-50. 
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supporters in the Eastern bloc of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policies, which 
led to more political freedom for Poland’s communist opposition, including the release of 
most political prisoners – notably Solidarity’s leadership.31  By February of 1989, 
Solidarity had been invited to negotiate with Poland’s communist government in what 
was called the Roundtable negotiations.32  Astonishingly, Solidarity’s demands were all 
met, including the legalization of Solidarity as a trade union, permission to publish 
independent newspapers, and most notably the creation of an Upper House in Poland’s 
parliament (the Senate, members of which were to be elected by free and open elections) 
and the free election of 35% of the 460 seats in the lower house of Poland’s parliament 
(the Sejm).33   
What followed in June of 1989 were the first semi-free parliamentary elections in 
the history of communist Poland. The results were overwhelmingly in favor of Solidarity: 
the communists had a default majority in the Sejm, and thus elected Wojciech Jaruzelski 
president, yet all but one of the contested seats went to Solidarity-dominated Citizen’s 
Committee (and the one outlying seat went to an independent candidate).  In districts 
where communists ran unopposed, no one was elected at all and the seats were declared 
vacant due to low voter turnout.34   Solidarity, under Walesa, formed an alliance with the 
former satellite parties of the Communist Party – the United Peasants Party and 
                                                 
31
 Szczerbiak (2004) p 57. 
 
32
 For more on the Roundtable see Adam Michnik (2000). “Independence reborn and the demons of the 
Velvet Revolution.”  Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath. Central 
European University Press.  pp. 81-99.  
 
33
 Kostelecky (2002) p 34. 
 
34
 Ibid. p 66. 
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Democratic Party.35  This new coalition then formed a non-communist majority in 
parliament under Catholic former dissident Tadeusz Mazowiecki,36 and on January 1, 
1990 Mazowiecki’s finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz introduced the Balcerowicz 
Plan, a privatization program more commonly known as “shock therapy.”37   
 
Solidarity’s Weaknesses as a Political Party 
Though Solidarity had emerged strong in the 1989 elections, certain elements of 
the Solidarity opposition movement were ill-suited to Solidarity as a political party.  The 
first element was its reliance on opposition to the Communist Party to identity itself.  
From the loss of the elections, its satellite parties, and its hold on power in general, the 
Polish Communist Party crumbled during the time between the 1989 election and the 
1990 presidential elections, leaving Solidarity without a clear political purpose.  
According to Joseph Rothschild and Nancy Wingfield, “Without a serious Communist 
antagonist, Solidarity now lost its solidarity.”38  Solidarity had long survived on the basis 
of just one goal – the defeat of the Communist Party.  Now that this goal had been 
achieved, its extremely variegated membership did not a cohesive ideological platform 
upon which to base itself. 
The second element of Solidarity’s weakness as a political party was the fact that 
Solidarity did not wish to identify itself as a political party at all!  According to Aleks 
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Szczerbiak, political parties have had a bad connotation for many Poles ever since the 
inter-war period, when party system chaos was blamed for the Second Republic’s 
inability to integrate and unify the Polish nation.39  This dissatisfaction with political 
parties was exacerbated ten times over by communist rule.  Not just in Poland, but also in 
all communist regimes, the word “party” came to refer only to the ruling Communist 
party and thus became stigmatized.40  According to Szczerbiak, “Forty years of one-party 
rule discredited not just the ruling communist party, but also the whole notion of party 
politics.”41  Hence, just as the Solidarity opposition movement claimed to be “the anti-
politics,”42 so did its successor parties shun traditional party platforms in favor of broad 
appeals to their non-party opposition past.  New political parties even avoided using the 
word “party” in their name, opting for variations like “forum” or “union”.43  Lech 
Walesa, in particular, often claimed during his subsequent political campaigns that he 
“rose above” party politics, a sentiment that served only to further undermine party 
development on Poland’s Right.44 
The final element of Solidarity’s weakness was the absence of a strong leadership.  
The trouble was most acute at the top of Solidarity’s leadership, where Prime Minister 
Mazowiecki and Walesa clashed constantly over everything from Mazowiecki’s cabinet 
picks to economic reform. In the end, Walesa left Solidarity to form his own party, 
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Center Alliance (PC), and pursue his accelerated reform agenda.45   As I will demonstrate 
in the rest of this chapter, this splintering was only the first of many ruptures to come in 
Solidarity’s future. 
 
The 1990 Presidential Election 
President Jaruzelski, sensing that his ousting was imminent, decided to resign 
from the office of president in 1990, prompting a new election to replace him, which for 
the first time in Poland would be decided by popular vote instead of by parliament.46  The 
1990 presidential elections proved the ultimate battleground for the two former Solidarity 
allies, Walesa and Mazowiecki, who were now facing off against each other for the 
presidential seat.  This election was less about party formation than about rivaling cults of 
personality.  Solidarity was now split into the more liberal (though still relatively centrist) 
faction, made up of supporters for Mazowiecki, and the more conservative faction, who 
favored Walesa.47  In the tradition of Solidarity’s trade union history, Walesa promoted 
himself as a traditionalist supporter of the blue-collar worker and the peasant, while 
Mazowiecki, whose supporters numbered mainly among Poland’s intellectuals 
(inteligencja), promoted himself as a modernist.48 The campaign was a messy one, with 
Walesa’s camp using anti-Semitic undertones in its attacks on Mazowiecki, and 
Mazowiecki’s camp disparaging Walesa for his uneducated speech.49  Election issues 
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included church-state relationship, individual vs. collective rights, and the definition of 
citizenship,50 but according to Rothschild and Wingfield, “Only a small role in the right 
between the Walesa and Mazowiecki camps was played by ideological or policy 
differences; it was primarily a matter of social animosities and personal alienations.”51  
Outside of this rivalry was the surprise “dark horse” candidate Stanislaw Tyminski, an 
American-born Polish businessman running as an independent.  Tyminski was seen as 
representing the Poland outside of the elite urban centers, and surprised everyone by 
coming in second place after Walesa.52  Below are the election results for the top four 
candidates: 
Table 1:  1990 Presidential Election Results, Top Four Candidates 
Candidate Percent of Votes 
First Round Second Round 
Lech Walesa (PC) 40.0% 74.3% 
Stan Tyminski (Independent) 23.1% 25.6% 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Solidarity) 18.1% - 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (Left) 9.2% - 
Source: Millard (1994); Rothschild and Wingfield (2000) p 234 
 
After Walesa’s victory, Mazowiecki resigned from the post of prime minister and formed 
a new moderate left-wing party, the Democratic Union (UD),53 which attracted many of 
Solidarity’s more liberal leaders, including Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik.  The loss of 
such iconic Solidarity leaders as Kuron and Michnik diminished the claims of right-wing 
parties claiming to be the heirs of Solidarity, since now Solidarity’s heirs were spread 
across several political parties and ideological positions. 
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The 1991 Parliamentary Election 
More than any other election, the 1991 parliamentary election put on display the 
wild disarray of Poland’s political party system.  A combination of an overabundance of 
ill-defined or immature parties (one party was named “The Beer Lover’s Party”!) with a 
very low electoral threshold to enter parliament resulted in an extremely fragmented 
Sejm.   According to Tomas Kostelecky, “New parties mushroomed, others split, and 
many electoral alliances and coalitions were established and dissolved. […] The highly 
proportional electoral system helped twenty-nine political parties gain representation in 
the Sejm…”54 
Table 2:  1991 Parliamentary Election Results for the Sejm 
Party or Coalition % of Vote Total Seats % of Seats 
Democratic Union (UD) 12.3% 62 13.5% 
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) 12.0% 60 13.0% 
Catholic Electoral Action 8.7% 49 10.7% 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 8.7% 48 10.4% 
Confederation for an Independent Poland 7.5% 46 10.0% 
Center Alliance (PC) 8.7% 44 9.6% 
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) 7.5% 37 8.0% 
Peasants Alliance  5.5% 28 6.1% 
Solidarity 5.1% 27 5.9% 
Beer Lovers Party 3.3% 16 3.5% 
Other parties 20.8% 43 9.4% 
Source:  Wade, Larry L. et al.  “Estimating participation and party voting in Poland:  the 1991 
parliamentary elections.”  East European Politics and Societies.  1994(8).55 
 
Though the results were so close that it is difficult to tell which party “won,” 
Mazowiecki’s centrist UD party managed to achieve the highest percentage of votes – 
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though at a mere 12.3% it was only half of what most surveys had predicted.56  Even if 
the results did not show a large victory for any one political philosophy, this election 
signaled a shift in Poland’s political spectrum from the right to the center and the left.  
UD’s platform was a more moderate version of the now-reformed Communist party, the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), whose agenda was mainly for state intervention in the 
economy, social welfare, and opposition to the interference of the Catholic Church in 
government – particularly the proposed ban on abortion.  The SLD gained just under 12% 
of the vote, earning second place in the election behind UD. 
 Due the prominent place Catholicism held in Polish society, it was no surprise 
that in third place at 8.73% came the Catholic Electoral Action (WAK) alliance, made up 
of the Christian-National Union (ZChN) party and other smaller parties.  While the ZChN 
portrayed itself as right-wing party due to its roots in Solidarity and its opposition to the 
Left, several of the positions taken by the party would be considered inconsistent with 
either Right or Left ideology.  In keeping with its right-wing status, the ZChN’s outlook 
“combined isolationist nationalism with a vision of a traditional, hierarchical society in 
which the church’s social teachings would be enforced by means of civil and criminal 
law.”57  However, its support of increased welfare programs and its antipathy towards 
“shock therapy” would have been more compatible with a left-wing political agenda.  
The minority government was formed from Christian National Union, Walesa’s Center 
Alliance (PC), and Peasants Alliance and was led by PC representative Jan Olszewski, a 
former member of the intellectual opposition.  This government fell after only six months 
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in office due to lustration scandals, namely “the attempt of the interior minister to reveal 
certain files containing the names of persons who had allegedly cooperated with the 
Communist secret police.”58  
Solidarity’s disintegration continued as several more parties splintered from it.  
The Union of Labor (UP) party formed at this time from Solidarity’s left wing and 
labeled itself as a social democratic party,59 and Jan Olszewski formed his own splinter 
party, the far-right Movement for the Republic (RdR).60 
 
The 1993 Parliamentary Election 
In response to the results of the previous election’s proportionality law, a new 
electoral law with a 5% electoral threshold (8% for coalitions) was put in place, and 
ensured that only 6 parties entered parliament after the 1993 parliamentary elections.  As 
Poles became increasingly frustrated with the economy, they looked to the Left for relief.  
The 1993 parliamentary elections were a big win for the Polish Left, led by SLD and the 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL).  
Table 3:  1993 Parliamentary Early Elections Results for the Sejm 
Party % of Vote Total Seats % of Seats 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 20.4% 171 37.2% 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 15.4% 132 28.7% 
Democratic Union (UD) 10.6% 74 16.1% 
Union of Labor 7.3% 41 8.9% 
Catholic Electoral Committee 
“Fatherland” 
6.4% - - 
Confederation for an Independent 
Poland (KPN) 
5.8% 22 4.8% 
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Non-Party Bloc for the Support of 
Reforms (BBWR) 
5.4% 16 3.5% 
German minority 0.6% 4 0.9% 
Other parties 28.2% - - 
Source:  “Monitor Polski,” No. 50, October 4, 1993.61 
 
The SLD-PSL coalition government took office under Prime Minister and PSL member 
Waldemar Pawlak.  Despite their social-democratic platforms, the SLD-PSL coalition 
proceeded, albeit with caution, with the economic reforms instated in the previous 
government.62 
The new, higher proportionality threshold and the failing economy were major 
blows to the highly splintered right wing of Poland’s political spectrum, with the end 
result being that “virtually all the parties of the right and centre-right, representing around 
one-third of the electorate, were excluded from parliament.”63  Poland’s Right, now for 
all intents and purposes absent from parliament, approached the next presidential election 
with very little electoral support. 
 
The 1995 Presidential Election 
This election represented a battle of the past, as it pitted Solidarity’s Lech Walesa 
(and incumbent president) against the post-communist SLD party’s Aleksander 
Kwasniewski. According to Aleks Szczerbiak, this election represented the “re-
emergence of this ‘historic’ division, which had lain dormant but was never quite 
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forgotten.”64  The Right was bitterly divided during the first round of elections, with five 
candidates vying to be the candidate for the Right, nearly all of whom had splintered 
from Solidarity in the recent past.  The right-wing candidates – including incumbent 
president Lech Walesa, Jacek Kuron, Jan Olszewski, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz and 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke – apparently “extended as much energy on attacking each other as 
they did on Kwasniewski,” making Walesa’s ultimate status as the front-running right-
wing candidate unsavory for many on the Right.65   
Table 4:  1995 Presidential Election Results (Top Five Candidates) 
Candidate Percentage of Vote 
First Round Second Round 
Aleksander Kwasniewski (SLD) 35.11% 51.72% 
Lech Walesa (PC) 33.11% 48.28% 
Jacek Kuron (UW) 9.22% - 
Jan Olszewski (RdR) 6.86% - 
Waldemar Pawlawk (PSL) 4.31% - 
Source:  Tworzecki, Hubert. (1996).  Parties and politics in post-1989 Poland.  Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press.  p 73 
 
Kwasniewski won by a slim margin, but Walesa did not leave office quietly.  Walesa’s 
outgoing interior minister accused SLD Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy of cooperating 
secretly with the KGB and spying for Moscow during the communist regime. 66  While 
Oleksy was later cleared of all espionage charges in 1996, the scandal created by his 
accusation forced his resignation.67  This incident is a perfect example of the tendency of 
the Polish Right to use lustration as a political weapon against their opponents when 
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normal modes of electoral competition failed.  Ironically, many of Solidarity’s key 
leadership during the 1980s, such as Adamn Michnik, vehemently opposed the use of 
lustration as a political tool, supporting the rehabilitation of former communist agents 
into Poland’s Third Republic rather than engaging in a witch-hunt against them.68  
Unfortunately, the strategy of lustration-as-weapon would continue to be employed by 
the Right throughout the 1990s. 
 
Conclusion 
 Solidarity enjoyed immense success as an opposition movement, but soon proved 
insufficient as a political party for several reasons.  First, without a communist 
government to oppose it was left on a shaky foundation of vague ideology and disjointed 
leadership.  Second, due the negative linkage between political parties and the 
Communist party, Solidarity had long prided itself on being “anti-politics” and was 
unwilling or unable to reverse its former anti-political position and become a political 
party.  Third, Solidarity’s leadership suffered a crisis of clashing personalities and 
political ideologies that left Poland’s Right without strong leadership.  Because of these 
factors, the first five years of the new political order proved devastating for Solidarity, as 
it dissolved into smaller niche parties that failed to win over voters. Despite the fact that 
the Solidarity political party (though it would never call itself that) emerged strong in the 
first few elections, it was soon destroyed by clashing personalities among its leadership, 
incongruous ideologies, poor party management, and a floundering economy.   Solidarity 
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had envisioned a united opposition to the former communists, but it ended up splintered 
into multiple, small, and weak parties that could not reach the electoral threshold for 
entry to parliament.  If the Polish Right had any hope of presenting a united opposition to 
the stable and successful Polish Left, they would have to develop a new strategy.  In the 
next chapter I will describe the Right’s next strategy – Solidarity Electoral Action.
Solidarity Electoral Action 
By 1995, Solidarity had proved that strength as an opposition movement did not 
equate to success as a political party.  With the Communist Party now out of power, 
Solidarity lacked a common purpose that would have united them as a political party.  In 
addition, Solidarity lacked good, strong leadership and even the desire to be viewed as a 
political party.  Beyond Solidarity’s weakness, the Left was able to maintain a strong, 
stable position in Poland’s politics that was equally unexpected and devastating to the 
Right.  In many ways the crushing defeat suffered by Lech Walesa in the 1995 
presidential election proved a useful lesson to the Right.   The Right learned that it 
needed to present a unified front in order to win elections, and the Right’s solution to this 
was Solidarity Electoral Action – an electoral bloc turned political party that was 
designed for the single purpose of gaining votes in the next election.  Like Solidarity, the 
bloc did not identify itself as a political party with a common ideological platform or one 
leader.  Instead, the bloc was a loose association of parties who identified with each other 
as successors to Solidarity but maintained loyalty only to their individual parties and 
leaders.  In this chapter I will describe how the bloc initially enjoyed success in the 1997 
elections, but soon began to weaken due to a crisis of leadership.  I will demonstrate how 
AWS employed decommunization and lustration as political tools against their rivals on 
the Left.  Finally, I will detail how AWS and the rest of the Right ultimately proved 
unable to compete with the stronger and more consolidated Left, and how by 2001 not a 
single right-wing party was able to gain enough votes to secure a place in parliament.
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The Formation of Solidarity Electoral Action 
The electoral bloc Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) formed in June 1996 as a 
conglomeration of almost forty69 right-wing parties and groups for the express purpose – 
as stated in its own “Declaration of the AWS” – of forming a unified opposition to the 
Left and winning the 1997 parliamentary elections.70  Member parties of AWS included 
Walesa’s centrist PC party, the Christian-nationalist ZChN, and the nationalist 
Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) – however it was the Solidarity trade 
union, with Marian Krzaklewski as its leader, that was the clear leader of the bloc.71  
Notably, the bloc did not include Jan Olszewski’s far-right Movement for the Republic 
(RdR) party, nor did it include former president Lech Walesa in a significant way.  
According to Aleksander Smolar, it was no coincidence that the first large-scale 
unification of the Right took place only after Walesa’s failed re-election:  “[Walesa] 
distrusted independent political forces and would attempt to weaken any party, no matter 
how close to him ideologically, that appeared to pose a threat to his personal position.”72  
The AWS bloc quickly found favor with Polish voters, and according to polls had already 
gained the support of 20% of the electorate by the summer of 1996.73   
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The 1997 Parliamentary Campaign 
By now the Right had learned that their most effective strategy against the Left 
was to defer to historical rivalry of communist-successor parties versus Solidarity-
successor parties.  It seemed that the Left, too, employed this rivalry in its campaign as it 
sought to blame the other side for the hardships of the economic transition.74  According 
to Smolar, both campaigns were centered on this rivalry: 
The Left warned against expansionism by the Church, the threat of 
decommunization and lustration, and the radicalism of the Right. The Right 
complained of continuing communist influence, the "red" oligarchy in the 
economy, and the nihilistic and anti-Christian character of the Left.75   
 
Surprisingly, the two sides spent less time on the discussion of the actual economy, but 
more time on “moral and historical” issues, such as decommunization and lustration.  
Decommunization is a general term that applies to removing legacies of the 
former Communist regime still present in public life.  This process varied in each post-
communist state.  In Poland, most Poles agreed that some form of decommunization was 
necessary, but it was the Right who showed the most support for it.  The chart below 
shows the results of a 1999 poll given to supporters of the various parties elected to 
parliament in 1997.   
Table 5:  Party Supporters’ Attitudes Towards Decommunization, October 1999 (in %) 
Party Name For Against Don’t Know 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 66 28 6 
Freedom Union (UW) 59 34 8 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 31 57 12 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 25 69 6 
Average 42 46 15 
Source:  Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej, Polacy o Lustracji I Dekomunizacji  
                                                 
74
 Blazyca, George and Marek Kolkiewicz.  (1999).  “Poland and the EU:  internal disputes, domestic 
politics and accession.”  Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics.  15(4).  p 133. 
 
75
 Smolar (1999) p 129. 
 
  
 
 
30
(Warsaw, OBOP, October 1999)76  The final row totals over 100%, likely due to rounding. 
As you can see, over two-thirds of AWS were supportive of decommunization, while 
over two-thirds of SLD were opposed to it.  The historical PSL party, which had roots in 
neither the Communist party nor Solidarity, appeared to be the most undecided. 
One of the most controversial elements of decommunization is lustration.  
Lustration is the practice of vetting public officials who have demonstrable links to the 
secret police during the Communist regime. Lustration was an extremely popular, if not 
extremely divisive, issue in Poland during the 1990s, with support for vetting communist 
officials never dipping below 50% in the period between June 1994 and September 1999.  
Support was highest in December of 1997, three months after the September 
parliamentary elections. 
Table 6:  Polish Attitudes Towards Vetting Key Public Officials, 1994-1999 (in %) 
 
June  
1994 
December  
1996 
December  
1997 
September 
1999 
Yes 57 57 76 56 
No 36 24 12 31 
Don’t Know 7 19 12 13 
Source:  Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej.  Ocena Procesu Lstracjnego (Warsaw, SBOS, October 
1999).77 
 
It is important to note that support for lustration in Poland extended beyond the right 
wing, and as a matter of fact it was the SLD President Kwasniewski who introduced a 
new lustration law in 1997.  There were many disputes in parliament after the bill’s 
introduction over amendments that would include intelligence officers in the vetting 
process, more broadly define “collaboration,” apply the process to a much wider range of 
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government officials, and over who would supervise this process.78  It is also striking that 
many of the original leaders of Solidarity, whom AWS purported to emulate, were 
opposed to lustration.  Adam Michnik, in particular, was vocal in his denunciation of the 
practice.79  Whether or not AWS’s campaign or the recent passage of the lustration bill 
deserves credit for the surge in popular support for lustration is unclear.  However, it is 
clear that AWS profited by making lustration a central campaign issue – whether by 
successfully promoting the issue or merely by reflecting public opinion. 
Another way that AWS exploited the (increasingly tenuous) connection between 
itself and the original Solidarity opposition movement was through symbols.   For 
example, when AWS came up with their agenda they purposely named them the “21 
programmatic tasks,” which were meant to represent the “21 demands” submitted by the 
first major shipyard strikers in August of 1980.  They even publicized these program 
tasks on the very anniversary of the signing of the first 21 demands.80 
 
The 1997 Parliamentary Election and Aftermath 
 AWS did extremely well in the 1997 parliamentary elections, earning over one-
fourth of the seats in the Sejm and over half of the seats in the Senate, beating the 
previous election’s winner, the SLD, by about 40 seats in the Sejm and 20 seats in the 
Senate. 
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Table 7:  1997 Parliamentary Election Results for the Sejm 
Party % of Vote Total Seats % of Seats 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 33.8% 201 43.7% 
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) 27.1% 164 35.7% 
Union of Freedom (UW) 13.4% 60 13.0% 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 7.3% 27 5.9% 
Movement for Poland’s Reconstruction (RdR) 5.6% 6 1.3% 
Union of Labor (UP) 4.7% - - 
German minority 0.6% 2 0.4% 
Other parties 7.5% - - 
Source:  Polish Press Agency, 1997.81 
 
Table 8:  1997 Parliamentary Election Results for the Senate 
Party Total Seats % of Seats 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 51 56.7% 
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) 28 20.0% 
Union of Freedom (UW) 8 8.9% 
Independent candidates 5 5.6% 
Movement for Poland’s Reconstruction 5 5.6% 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 3 3.3% 
Source:  Polish Press Agency, 1997.82 
 
Due to the dominance of the two rival electoral blocs – AWS and SLD - there were 
significantly fewer votes for small parties this election, with only 7.5% of the vote going 
to parties too minor to obtain the 5% threshold to enter parliament, as opposed to 28.2% 
of the vote in the 1993 elections.83  After the election, AWS formed a coalition 
government with the fellow Solidarity-successor UW party, though beyond a common 
past the two parties shared next to nothing ideologically.  UW was economically Right 
(as its leader, Balcerowicz had been the architect of “shock therapy”) while AWS held 
much more redistributive economic views; AWS was strongly conservative on social 
matters while UW was much more secularist.  Anna Pluta called the governing coalition 
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“more a marriage of convenience than a working partnership,”84 and it soon began to 
suffer under the strain of divisive issues like Poland’s accession to the European Union, 
leadership, and lustration controversies. 
 According to Clare McManus-Czubinska, EU accession – amazingly – was not an 
important election issue for either the candidates or the electorate at large during this 
time.  Even as late as the 2001 campaign, when McManus-Czubinska and her colleagues 
conducted a survey on issues important to voters they found that EU accession was less 
important than other issues such as unemployment, crime, or taxation.85  Even though it 
was not important during the campaign, EU accession quickly became a polarizing issue 
for the AWS-UW coalition government. The more liberal elements of AWS, such as PC, 
were strong proponents of a speedy EU accession, while the more conservative Christian 
and nationalist elements sought to delay accession by introducing more and more 
stringent conditions for entry.  Objections to joining the EU were usually driven by 
concern for the hardships that would result from implementing all of the reforms 
required, as well as a fear of losing Poland’s national (and religious) identity to 
“Brussels.”86       
Party leader Krzaklewski, seeking to appease both factions of the bloc, settled for 
supporting the more vague concept of “European integration” and promoted a “Europe of 
nations” in which Poland’s national and religious character could be preserved.87  
                                                 
84
 Pluta (2004) p 160. 
 
85
 McManus-Czubinska, Clare, William L. Miller, Radoslaw Markowski and Jacek  
Wasilewski.  (2003).  “The new Polish ‘Right’?”.  Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics.  
19(2). p 15. 
 
86
 Pluta (2004) p 155-157. 
 
87
 Ibid.  p 157. 
  
 
 
34
Unfortunately for the governing coalition, Krzaklewski’s compromises were unable to 
mollify the various factions of the coalition.  Promises that EU accession would not 
secularize Poland reassured many of AWS’s parties, but not the more religious nationalist 
elements.  The radical Catholic Radio Maryja became a vocal opponent of EU 
accession,88 though the Catholic Church itself (notably the Polish-born Pope John Paul II) 
encouraged Poland to join the EU.89  Nor did Krzaklewski’s compromise do anything to 
appease AWS’s centrist coalition partner, UW, who was a strong supporter of EU 
accession.  In addition the sitting SLD President Kwasniewski, who could block any 
legislation he viewed as a radical deviation from the EU accession process, added another 
stumbling block in the way of a unified AWS-UW position on EU accession.90 
Since the coalition was made up of numerous smaller parties, the issue of 
leadership became a sore subject among the governing coalition.  After AWS-UW’s 
victory in the 1997 parliamentary elections, little-known Jerzy Buzek was elected prime 
minister in lieu of AWS party leader Marian Krzaklewski, presumably because 
Krzaklewski wished to run for president in 2000.  At first Buzek enjoyed popularity for 
his complacent and conciliatory style of governance, but his support began to waver after 
a series of labor protests in January 1999.  According to Szczerbiak, “After that, the 
Buzek administration spent the next three years lurching from crisis to crisis and lacked 
any clear sense of direction.”91 AWS’s popularity in the polls began to wane, and 
divisions emerged in the AWS-UW coalition over economic policy and leadership style.  
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Power-sharing of various government ministerial positions between opposing factions of 
the coalition produced dispute after dispute on a wide variety of issues – with EU 
integration, the economy, and national defense topping the list of issues.92   Due to the 
numerous conflicts, the UW eventually decided to leave the coalition government.  The 
coalition broke apart in June of 2000, leaving Buzek’s AWS in the position of a minority 
government.93   
 Lustration controversies added a further twist to the internal drama of AWS 
leadership.  AWS had devoted a large portion of its 1997 campaign to promises to break 
from the communist past and shore up the lustration law, which it did in 1998 after taking 
office.  The June 1998 lustration amendments concentrated the authority for the lustration 
proceedings in the hands of the “Public Interest Spokesman” and appointing the Warsaw 
District Appeal Court as the designated venue.  The amendments also allowed members 
of the Polish parliament “to initiate lustration procedures themselves through the 
introduction of the so-called ‘parliamentary denunciation’.”94  It wasn’t long before the 
bloc began using lustration as a weapon against its political enemies, including SLD 
President Kwasniewski and even former Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who were 
brought to trail prior to the 2000 presidential election with unfounded charges of 
espionage under the Communist regime.95  The vicious infighting continued during the 
2000 presidential election. 
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The 2000 Presidential Election 
 The September 2000 presidential election served yet another blow to the 
weakened AWS.  Before Krzaklewski was chosen, there was a dispute among the 
different factions of AWS as to who would be the official AWS presidential nominee.  As 
the party leader, Marian Krzaklewski was the logical choice, but disagreements within 
the bloc led to the formation of several splinter parties.  A more liberal contingent within 
the bloc, centered on the Conservative People’s Party, had presented an alternate 
candidate to Krzaklewski – Sejm Marshal Maciej Plazynski.  Meanwhile AWS’s former 
coalition partner UW decided not to back any candidate officially, but two-thirds of its 
electorate voted for independent center-right candidate Andrzej Olechowski.96  In the end 
Krzaklewski was chosen to be AWS’s candidate, but he had considerably less support 
from his former coalition. 
According to Frances Millard, this campaign was “not issue-based, but candidate-
based.”97  In the face of the fragmentation of his party, voter disapproval of the lustration 
trials of Kwasniewski and Walesa, and the bad economy, AWS candidate Krzaklewski 
entered the campaign with a distinct disadvantage.  Voter turnout was unusually high at 
61%,98 which signaled that Polish voters were eager for a change in government.  
Incumbent SLD President Kwasniewski impressively garnered more than 50% of the 
vote, while Krzaklewski was lucky to come in third at 15.57 % of the vote (which was 
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more than three times less votes than Kwasniewski), trailing behind Olechowski, who 
earned 17.3% of the vote.99   
Table 9:  2000 Presidential Election Results 
Candidate Percent of Vote 
Aleksander Kwasniewski (SLD) 53.9% 
Andrzej Olechowski (Independent) 17.3% 
Marian Krzaklewski (AWS) 15.6% 
Jaroslaw Kalinowski (PSL) 6.0% 
Andrzej Lepper (SO) 3.1% 
Lech Walesa (Christian Democrat)100 1.0% 
Source:  Panstwowa Komisja Wyborczu (State Election Commission)101 
 
After the election, Olechowski would later team up in January 2001 with Conservative 
People’s Party leader Plazynski and UW leader Donald Tusk to form a new center-right 
political party called the Civic Platform (PO).  Also around the time of the formation of 
PO, another conservative party was forming under AWS justice minister Lech Kaczynski 
and his twin brother Jaroslaw.  This party, called the Law and Justice party (PiS), was 
based on Lech and Jaroslaw’s hard-lined platform against corruption and crime.102  The 
rest of AWS disintegrated into other, smaller parties, notably the radical Christian 
nationalist party called the League of Polish Families (LPR).  This party had strong ties 
with the extremist Catholic radio network, Radio Maryja.103  The remaining members of 
AWS formed the Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (AWSP), with Olszewski’s 
Movement for the Republic (RdR) party (a former outlier of AWS) as the dominating 
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party and the Solidarity trade union, now officially retired from politics, only nominally 
voicing its support for it.104  AWSP, wounded and weary, desperately needed to gain 
votes in the 2001 elections to stay in parliament. 
 
The 2001 Parliamentary Election 
 Polish party politics experienced a great upset in the 2001 elections, with four out 
of six of the new parties elected being new to parliament.  Paul Lewis points out that 
much of the shift in power was due to a wave of Euroskepticism in Poland, which found 
its voice through the extreme Christian-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR), one 
of the parties that had recently left the AWS bloc, and the radical populist Self-Defense 
party (SO).105  Euroskepticism and support for the preservation of Polish national identity 
served SO particularly well, as it gained ten times the votes it did in the previous election 
(10% versus 1%).106  SLD, the party with the most consistent and committed membership 
of all of Poland’s political parties at the time,107 easily won the election, earning over 
three times the amount of votes as its closet competitor, the new center-right PO party.  
Table 10:  2001 Parliamentary Election Results for the Sejm 
Party % of Votes Total Seats % of Seats 
Democratic Left Alliance / Labor Union 
(SLD/UP) 
41.04% 216 47.16% 
Civic Platform (PO) 12.68% 65 14.19% 
Self-Defense (SO) 10.20% 53 11.57% 
Law and Justice (PiS) 9.50% 44 9.61% 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 8.98% 42 9.17% 
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League of Polish Families (LPR) 7.87% 38 8.29% 
Solidarity Election Action of the Right 
(AWSP) 
5.60% - - 
Freedom Union (UW) 3.10% - - 
Source:  Rzeczpospolita, 19 October 2001, and Polish State Electoral Commission.108 
 
The final nail in the coffin of AWS was its decision to register the new AWSP as an 
electoral coalition for the 2001 parliamentary elections.  Registering as a coalition 
required it to reach a higher percentage of the vote than a single party in order to meet the 
threshold for entry into parliament.  Polls revealed that none of the individual parties 
making up AWS could survive an election in their own,109 but neither could they survive 
together.  As a result, the meager 5.6% of the vote they earned in the 2001 parliamentary 
elections was not enough to meet the 8% required (though ironically, it would have been 
just enough for the requirements for a single party).110  Thus the largest-scale Right 
coalition in Polish party politics went from earning the highest percentage in one election 
to earning too few votes to enter parliament in the next election – all in one five year 
parliamentary cycle. 
 
Conclusions 
In many ways, Solidarity Electoral Action was able to accomplish what previous 
attempts at a Right coalition were unable to do – to unite the highly fragmented Right 
long enough to get elected – however its strategy of using historical roots in Solidarity as 
the entire basis of the bloc proved inadequate for maintaining unity.  In order to get 
elected, AWS emphasized their own Solidarity history through names and symbols, 
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antagonized their political rivals as communists or collaborators (notably through 
lustration), and stressed their common goal of a Christian, national Poland.  AWS’s 
coalition partner, UW, was seemingly only chosen because of its common Solidarity 
heritage, even though UW was more of a center-left party in terms of social ideology than 
right-wing.  While it’s evident that AWS’s strategy was successful in earning them votes 
in the 1997 election, it did little in the way of maintaining party unity or effective 
leadership.  Soon major issues like EU accession divided the bloc between the social 
liberals, who supported quick EU accession, and the conservatives, who sought to defend 
Poland’s national Christian identity from the EU.  In addition, in a coalition of over forty 
smaller groups, each with its own leader, conflicts over leadership soon emerged.  The 
selection process of a common candidate for president in the 2000 election resulted in 
fragmentation within the bloc, which was already suffering in the polls.   
By 2001 the coalition was in a very weakened position as it entered the 
parliamentary campaign.  By this campaign the two consistent features of the AWS 
platform, namely decommunization and the support for Poland’s national religious 
identity, had gradually “diminished as the basis for political divisions,” remaining 
relevant only for “the far left and right flanks.”111  Increased Euroskepticism in the 
country led to support for extremist nationalist parties like Self-Defense (SO) and League 
of Polish Families (LPR).  These two parties, along with AWS splinter parties Civic 
Platform (PO) and Law and Justice party (PiS), would become prominent fixtures in the 
next elections in 2005 and 2007.  For all of their weakness, AWS might have survived 
another term in parliament if they had decided to register as a single party instead of a 
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coalition.  As it was, the bloc was completely eliminated from parliament in 2001, as it 
had been in 1993.   
The Right took this time out of power to rethink its electoral strategy.  The main 
flaw with AWS’s electoral strategy was its reliance on the historical divide between the 
Communist-successors and the Solidarity-successors to attract voters.  Often AWS 
campaign issues, such as lustration, equated to an ultimatum to voters:  you are either 
with Solidarity, or you are with the communists.  AWS failed to create a unified ideology 
or leadership that would sustain the party beyond their election into office.  In the next 
chapter I will demonstrate how AWS splinter parties learned from AWS’s mistakes and 
began to depart from the post-communist divide as an electoral strategy.  
The Return of the Right 
  
 After the 2001 parliamentary elections, Poland’s Right found itself once again on 
the outside of Poland’s politics.  By the time the 2005 parliamentary and presidential 
elections came around, Poland’s Right had a distinct advantage over the Left, who was 
weakened by internal conflicts, a rise in domestic social conservatism, and voter fatigue 
with the ruling government.  Yet Poland’s right-wing parties did more than just get their 
candidates elected to parliament.  The withdrawal of the major left-wing candidate for 
president forced the two largest parties on the right, Civic Platform (PO) and Law and 
Justice (PiS) to compete with one another instead of their usual rivals on the Left.  This 
competition not only overcame the post-communist/post-Solidarity division that had 
characterized every election since 1989, but it also forced the parties of the Right to 
create distinct identities and platforms – a factor that increased their stability and 
durability until the next election.  By the 2007 election the divide of historical identities 
was almost completely transcended, and the two right-wing parties were more secure in 
their identity and more likely to secure a permanent place in Poland’s political party 
spectrum than ever before. 
 
The Left’s Deterioration and the Return of the Right 
The period between the 2001 and the 2005 elections proved to be a mixture of 
triumph and tragedy for Poland’s left.  While President Kwasniewski’s administration
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oversaw Poland’s successful accession to the European Union, his party was significantly 
weakened during this period.  Like the structural weaknesses suffered by the AWS 
coalition in the late 1990s, SLD now faced a crisis of leadership and fragmentation – 
though not at the devastating scale as the AWS did.  Conflicts over the party’s leadership, 
ideology, and management created rifts in the usually stable party.112  When over thirty 
deputies broke away from the SLD/UP coalition in March 2004 to form the new Social 
Democracy of Poland (SdPl) party, they left the SLD government in minority status in 
parliament.113  SLD Prime Minister Leszek Miller oversaw Poland’s EU accession on 
May 1, 2004 and resigned from office the next day because of the scandals and internal 
problems facing his party, and – in his own words – because of the public perception of 
the “cancer of dishonesty” plaguing politics in Poland.114   
Former Finance Minister Marek Belka became the new prime minister in June 
2004 after failing a previous vote of confidence. According to Millard, “Marek Belka was 
a semi-detached member of the SLD from its most pro-capitalist liberal wing.”115  His 
disassociation with the party would be his downfall.  Belka’s Finance Minister, Jerzy 
Hausner, was engaged in the creation of a new center-left party, Democratic Party (PD), 
and Belka’s refusal to dismiss him resulted in the SLD withdrawing their support for both 
men, who consequently resigned and joined the new party.  The SLD next tapped the 
well-respected Wojciech Olejniczak to replace Belka.  Prime Minister Olejniczak and the 
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SLD immediately began a purge of their electoral list of members who did not uphold the 
SLD party line.116   
The SLD’s turbulent reign provided an opportunity for the Polish Right to 
regroup.  Several factors in their favor were already present:  growing dissatisfaction with 
the SLD government and a recent surge in domestic religiosity and social conservatism.  
According to Millard, the death of John Paul II – the former Polish cardinal who vocally 
opposed Poland’s communist rule and supported Solidarity – was “a profound experience 
of shared mourning and reaffirmation of national religiosity”117 that prompted a surge in 
social conservatism.  Some social issues, such as abortion and religious education had 
fallen largely out of the public debate, but new issues such as gay rights were pushed to 
the forefront in the 2005 elections. The two major right-wing parties, Tusk’s PO and 
Kaczynski’s PiS, had announced early in the campaign that they would seek to form a 
coalition once elected to parliament, and together they embarked on a joint campaign 
mission to “improve the decency and transparency of public life, fight corruption, [and] 
unveil clientelistic links between the economics and political domain.”118  This would set 
the tone for the entire election, which would focus more on corruption and economic 
issues (such as taxation) than on social issues. 
 
The 2005 Election 
President Kwasniewski moved up the date of the parliamentary election, making 
it almost concurrent with the 2005 presidential election.  Since there was little time in 
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between the two elections, presidential and parliamentary campaigns began to merge as 
political parties tried to equalize their candidates for Sejm and the Senate with their 
presidential candidates in order to gain votes.  Therefore, it is not useful to separate the 
two campaigns for analysis.  I will examine the campaign strategy and ideology of the 
political parties by their ideological position:  left, center, or right. 
 
The Left 
 The story of the Left in the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections is a 
short one.  Over the course of Polish elections after 1989, the balance of power 
predictably shifted from Left to Right every election, and as the incumbent government, 
it was to be expected that SLD would not win the 2005 election.  However, its extremely 
poor performance in the parliamentary race – winning a mere 5% of the Senate vote (and 
no seats) and just over 11% of the Sejm vote – came as a shock to many.  The first factor 
in its decline was waning support.  In addition to the party shake-ups mentioned before, 
voter dissatisfaction with the SLD government’s response to the faltering Polish economy 
and growing social inequality led to its support dropping from over 40% in 2001 to 11% 
in 2005.119    
 An additional factor contributing to SLD’s poor parliamentary election 
performance was the disaster of its presidential campaign. According to Radoslaw 
Markowski, PO and PiS’s announcement that they would form a coalition if elected to 
parliament might have been to the advantage of a Left presidential candidate: “the 
expectation was that Poles might reject the idea of having both crucial positions, prime 
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minister and president, filled by the same political camp.”120  Even though the 
opportunity was there, SLD failed to mobilize an opposition campaign to the Right.  Due 
to internal dissent, the only suitable candidate for president that the SLD could agree on 
was Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.  According to Millard, “only Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
was sufficiently popular, experienced, and untainted with the heavy brush of corruption,” 
yet Cimoszewicz admitted that he found himself “increasingly detached” from the SLD 
party.121 After a lackluster campaign and complaints of media attacks against his family, 
Cimoszewicz withdrew from the campaign, leaving no major left-wing candidate in the 
running.  Without a presidential candidate to rally around, the SLD had little electoral 
support for the parliamentary elections.   
 A final factor to the SLD’s disadvantage was the similarity of their electoral 
program to other parties.  Like the smaller SdPl party, which was unable to gain any seats 
in either the Sejm or the Senate, SLD “restated a renewed commitment to left-wing 
principles, to democracy, and to Europe,”122 yet its populist-socialist economic platform 
was echoed by several other parties, including their right-wing rival Law and Justice 
(PiS).  Pro-socialist voters could have their pick of several parties, and not many chose to 
remain loyal to the debilitated SLD.    
 The only left-wing party to see an increase in support was the enigmatic Self 
Defense (SO) party.  SO declared itself to be the “new Left” and emphasized religious 
conservatism and populist economic policy.  Even though SO chose to self-identify with 
the Left, its populist economic policy and extreme social conservatism make it more akin 
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to right-wing LPR or even PiS.  Unlike PiS and LPR, however, SO did not claim to be a 
successor of Solidarity, nor did it pursue decommunization or lustration as a campaign 
issue.123  SO’s presidential candidate, Andrzej Lepper, did remarkably well in the 
presidential election, coming in at third place in the first round with 15.11% of the vote.  
SO also fared well in the parliamentary election, beating SLD by one seat in the Sejm and 
earning three seats in the Senate.   
 In conclusion, the strongest figure of the Left, the SLD, was substantially 
weakened by a lack of both real and symbolic leadership (namely, a presidential 
candidate), and for the first time its electorates realized the SLD was not the only party 
offering the socialist or secularist platform that they desired.  After Cimoszewicz’s 
withdrawal from the presidential campaign, a significant number of former SLD voters 
voted for centrist or right-wing candidates instead. 
 
The Center 
 While the Center of Poland’s political spectrum varied in its social policy, it had 
in common a “liberal” economic policy similar to the Right in Western democracies that 
supported less progressive taxation (and sometimes a flat tax) and the increased 
liberalization of Poland’s markets.  Only two Polish parties espoused economic liberalism 
in their party platforms – center-left Democratic Party (PD) and center-right Civic 
Platform (PO).  PD was basically a revamped Freedom Union (UW) with the addition of 
a small contingent of former SLD members, notably former PM Belka and Hausner.124  
PD did not manage to win seats in either the Sejm or the Senate and the independent 
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presidential candidate it chose to support, Henryka Bochniarz, earned only 1% of the 
vote. 
 Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform party (PO) has often been grouped with the right-
wing of Poland’s politics due to its Solidarity roots and strongly conservative social 
policies, however its staunch support for the free-market, its proposed flat-tax, and its 
constituency of transition “winners” differ so much from the socialist platforms of either 
the right or the left as to make its categorization difficult.125  PO is derived from the 
economically “liberal” contingent of the Solidarity opposition under communist rule.  
This faction “criticized the leadership of the [Solidarity] movement for concentrating on 
issues such as democracy and equality and for maintaining economic policies that had a 
‘socialist character.’”126  According to Gavin Rae, “Tusk developed a dogmatic support 
for the free market, to the extent that he even claimed at the end of the 1980s that he 
would prefer a free-market economy without democracy to socialism with free 
elections.”127 Unlike most of Poland’s Right, PO may be economically liberal, but like 
the Right it supports solidly conservative social policies, including an opposition to 
abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriages or civil unions.128  Because PO is a center-
right party, I will continue my discussion of PO’s campaign in the next section.     
 
The Right 
 The two most right-wing parties in the 2005 election were League of Polish 
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Families (LPR) and PiS.  A major theme of both of their campaigns was the dawn of the 
“Fourth Republic” (the so-called “Third Republic” began in 1991 with the first free 
elections in Poland).  According to Millard: 
The Fourth Republic would experience moral cleansing through deep lustration, 
anti-corruption measures, and reaffirmation of Catholic values, its new 
Constitution would repair the state; it would heal society with a social contract 
including fundamental changes in social and economic policy.129   
 
PiS’s intended coalition partner PO also supported moderate religious conservatism and 
lustration, but as I’ve mentioned before their economic policies differed greatly.  These 
differences were accentuated when PiS and PO were forced to compete with one another 
later in the race. 
 The withdrawal of SLD presidential candidate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz left the 
two intended coalition partners in a very awkward position:  as the only two major 
contenders for the presidency still in place, they were forced to alter their campaign 
strategies – and even their ideological stances – in order to compete with one another.130  
PiS took the initiative and drew a new line of competition between itself and PO – that of 
“Solidarists” like PiS and “liberals” like PO.131  This competition at once signaled that 
the usual campaign strategy of harping on historical divisions had passed and also forced 
the two right-wing parties to solidify their own agendas and distinguish themselves from 
their rival. 
PiS expended the most effort in reshaping its identity, moving considerably 
towards the Left on economic issues and significantly towards the Right on social issues.  
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The central issue of contention between the two parties was economic policy, specifically 
PO’s proposed flat tax and PiS’s progressive tax plan.  According to Millard, “…PiS 
offered a stark choice between PO’s ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and its own 
‘social’ or ‘solidarity’ Poland.”132 In an effort to distance itself from PO, PiS’s economic 
policies became more and more populist-socialist. PiS purported to stick up for the 
transition’s “losers” and launched attacks at Leszek Balcerowicz, former leader of UW 
(Donald Tusk’s old party) and author of the infamous “Balcerowicz Plan.”133  Their 
offensive did not stop there, but extended to leaders of all parties since the transition:  
“The PiS party leadership […] launched a campaign as if they had been absent from the 
Polish politics of the past decade and a half.  They blamed everyone for the alleged 
failure.”134  His party’s increasing socialist policies inspired PiS presidential candidate 
Lech Kaczysnki to woo disenfranchised voters of the Left.  Kaczynski even admitted 
(truthfully or not) to admiring some elements of communism, “including its contribution 
to culture and to women’s rights”135 – a move that would have been politically 
unthinkable under the old campaign strategy of Solidarity-successors versus Communist-
successors.    The result of this aggressive campaigning was that PiS managed to win 
over some of Cimoszewicz’s supporters from the Left after his withdrawal from the race, 
“mainly the retired and marginalized.”136   
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PiS also radicalized its social platform.  According to Markowski, “PiS underwent 
a spectacular change from a fairly typical conservative party with noticeable though weak 
nationalist and populist leanings, into a radical nationalist, and visibly populist-socialist 
one.”137  In order to expand its base, PiS looked to the radical Right for support and 
earned backing from LPR and religious fundamentalists under the guidance of radical 
Catholic Radio Maryja.138 PiS supporters had become by 2005 more Euroskeptic, more in 
favor of strengthening lustration laws, more amenable to the influence of the Catholic 
Church in public life, and more opposed to privatization.139  
Though PO tried to fight back against PiS’s attacks, PiS’s more sophisticated 
campaign had managed to successfully label PO “the party of the flat tax” and of rich, 
greedy elites.140  In addition, even though polls had predicted that PO would win the 
parliamentary race, PiS’s Lech Kaczynski was significantly more popular with the 
electorate than Donald Tusk in the presidential race.  Kaczynski and independent 
candidate Zbigniew Religa were considered campaign frontrunners until Religa withdrew 
after a disorganized and weak campaign.141  Tusk managed to make headway in the polls 
by gaining some of the departed candidate’s disappointed supporters, who were urged by 
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Religa himself to support Tusk.142  Thus both Tusk and Kaczynski had managed to pick 
up votes from other parties. 
 
The 2005 Election Results 
 Turnout at the parliamentary election was the lowest it had ever been in post-
communist Poland – a mere 40.5% of eligible voters turned out.  Contrary to earlier 
projections, PiS easily carried the Sejm and Senate, earning over twenty more seats than 
PO in the Sejm and fifteen more seats in the Senate.  Jaroslaw Kaczynski stepped back 
from an offer to become prime minister in order to boost his brother Lech’s chances at 
winning the presidency.143   
Table 11:  2005 Parliamentary Election Results for the Sejm 
Party % of Vote Total Seats % of Seats 
Law and Justice (PiS) 26.99% 155 33.7% 
Civic Platform (PO) 24.14% 133 28.9% 
Self-Defense (SO) 11.41% 56 12.2% 
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) 11.31% 55 12.0% 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 7.97% 34 7.4% 
Polish Peasants Party 6.96% 25 5.4% 
German minority 0.29% 2 0.4% 
Polish Social Democracy (SdPl) 3.89% - - 
Democratic Party (PD) 2.45% - - 
Source:  Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza.144 
 
Table 12:  2005 Parliamentary Election Results for the Senate 
Party Total Seats 
Law and Justice (PiS) 49 
Civic Platform (PO) 34 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 7 
Self-Defense (SO) 3 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 2 
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New Senate 2005 1 
Committee for Kazimierz Julian Kutz 1 
Committee for Professor Marian Milek 1 
Committee for Maciej Plazynski 1 
Committee for Bogdan Borusewicz 1 
Source:  Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza.145 
 
Voter turnout for the presidential was also low, but at 49.7% it was higher than the 
parliamentary elections.  In the first round Tusk was in first, having gained a 3% lead 
over Kaczynski.  However in the run-off race many of the supporters of the defeated SO 
and PSL parties chose to support Kaczynski over Tusk, resulting in Kaczynski winning 
over Tusk a margin of 10%. 
Table 13:  2005 Presidential Election Results 
Candidate Percentage of Votes 
First Round Second Round 
Donald Tusk (PO) 36.33% 45.96% 
Lech Kaczynski (PiS) 33.10% 54.04% 
Andrzej Lepper (SO) 15.11% - 
Marek Borowski (SdPl) 10.33% - 
Jaroslaw Kalinowski (PSL) 1.80% - 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Independent) 1.43% - 
Henryka Bochniarz (supported by PD) 1.26% - 
Source:  Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza.146 
 
After the victory of PiS and Kaczynski, it came as little surprise that the proposed 
PO-PiS coalition was no longer on the table.  PO had originally agreed to the coalition 
under the assumption that it would be the senior partner, and now that the situation was 
the reverse, “essentially [Civic Platform] did not want the junior role now offered by 
PiS…”147 Millard explains that “bitterness, shock, and personal animosities also played a 
role, with a lack of mutual trust and the feeling that the Kaczynskis would not hesitate to 
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use PO as a whipping boy for economic failure.”148 After the election, PiS appeared to be 
delivering on campaign promises, but it still lacked the majority in Parliament necessary 
to advance their agenda.  Hence, PiS, like the AWS before it, created an oddly-matched 
coalition with LPR and SO, two parties that were significantly more extremist than PiS.  
 
Analysis of the 2005 Election 
 While the 2001 election effectively disintegrated the unified Right, the 2005 
election resulted in the division and weakening of the Left.  The competition between the 
two main factions of the Right – PiS and PO – at once divided the Right between the 
moderates and the extremists and in addition forced the two parties to solidify their 
ideology and platforms.  The parties of the Right have begun to carve out their own niche 
in the electorate instead of constantly competing over the same voters,149 thus stabilizing 
their support.   
 The biggest significance of the 2005 elections was that the old communist-
successor versus Solidarity-successor divide had begun to wane.  Besides the SLD, all of 
the major political parties had their roots in Solidarity or (like the PSL) were not 
connected with either Solidarity or the old Communist party.  In addition the campaigns 
focused less on historical issues like lustration, and more on economic plans like taxation.  
This trend away from historical divisions continued into the next elections in 2007.   
 
The 2007 Election 
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 The 2007 elections were held two years earlier than previously scheduled due to 
disputes between coalition partners and within the PiS party itself, followed by a dramatic 
overhauling of the reigning government.  PiS’s internal problems began with their choice 
for prime minister.  After President Lech Kaczynski’s twin brother Jaroslaw declined the 
post of prime minister in 2005, PiS member Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz was appointed.  
Marcinkiewicz came from the more liberal side of PiS and therefore clashed with the 
more conservative coalition partners, LPR and SO.  Jaroslaw Kaczynski and 
Marcinkiewicz had an uneasy relationship from the start – while Marcinkiewicz was 
nominally in charge, it was Kaczynski who “remained the unquestioned leader” of the 
party.150  According to Szczerbiak, Marcinkiewicz’s independent thinking was both a 
benefit and a detriment:  “Marcinkiewicz quickly carved out a niche and became 
Poland’s most popular politician by portraying himself as a hard-working an 
independent-minded prime-minister above the political fray,” the result of which was 
Marcinkiewicz’s dismissal in July 2006 and Jaroslaw Kaczynski deciding to replace 
Marcinkiewicz as prime minister himself.151   
As with the failed AWS bloc, PiS experienced problems with their coalition 
partners.  First, the influence of LPR on the PiS government resulted in a social policy 
that became more and more extremist.  As a result of their position in power, Poland 
passed one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe – making abortion illegal in 
most cases except where the health of the mother is threatened or the pregnancy is a 
result of sexual violence.  LPR leaders attempted to pass an even more restrictive 
                                                 
150
 Szczerbiak, Aleks.  (2008).  “The birth of a bipolar party system of a referendum on a polarizing 
government?  The October 2007 Polish parliamentary election.”  Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics.  24(3).  p 417. 
 
151
 Ibid.  p 417-418. 
  
 
56
measure that would outlaw abortions for rape victims as well, but President Kaczynski 
eventually put his foot down and blocked the proposed law.152  In addition there was a 
surge in anti-homosexual rhetoric on the part of LPR, with delegate Ewa Sowinska 
criticizing the so-called promotion of homosexuality in Poland’s schools153 and calling 
for the ban of the children’s television show The Teletubbies for its depiction of an 
allegedly homosexual character, which echoed a similar criticism of the show by the late 
U.S. televangelist Jerry Falwell.154   In addition there were several scandals in the SO 
party, notably sexual harassment and bribery allegations against the party leaders, 
including Andrzej Lepper.155  Next LPR and SO attempted to create their own coalition 
and formally withdrew from their original coalition agreement with PiS.  After the 
withdrawal of LPR and SO, Kaczynski declared the original coalition agreement to be 
voided and fired all the ministers appointed from the two smaller parties.  As a result of 
this the Sejm voted to dissolve the current parliamentary term and hold early elections for 
the next term.156  The three dominant players were PiS, the weakened Left, and PO.  
According to Anna Gwiazda, the 2007 election was marked by its concentration on “hard 
issues” such as the economy and health care that had previously given way to social 
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issues like abortion and religion.157  This shift in campaign issues indicated a positive 
step away from the bitter rivalries of the past based on historical legacy alone. 
 
The Law and Justice Party 
 Soon after PiS’s government came to power, they became unpopular with the 
media and the urban elite due to scandals, the growing Catholic radical faction in their 
coalition partnership, and an inability to fulfill campaign promises, notably the highly 
progressive tax policy with which they had campaigned.158  For all of their problems, 
Aleks Szczerbiak expressed surprise that they lasted in power as long as they did:  
“The Law and Justice party’s ability, unlikely governing parties in the two 
previous parliaments, both to remain organizationally intact and to retain a firm 
hold on a significant portion of the electorate, was remarkable given the 
government’s frequent political crisises.”159   
 
The party focused on fighting corruption per its campaign promises, yet failed to instate 
any major social or economic reforms that would have an immediate effect on their 
electoral support.160  Many on the Left who had supported PiS only because of its 
populist economic policy were sorely disappointed, and the Kaczynski government was 
the object of a number of protests by teachers and health care workers.161   
Going into the 2007 elections, the public perception of PiS was not positive.  An 
August 2007 survey revealed that over 60% of respondents considered the political 
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situation in Poland “bad”.162  The worsening economy combined with the alienating 
radical social policies that had come to be associated with PiS (because of its ties to LPR 
and SO) left that party in a weakened place politically. PiS’s disadvantaged position in 
the election caused it to use its anti-corruption platform as a weapon against its 
opponents, implicating members of their rival’s party in bribery and corruption, notably 
the PO deputy Beata Sawicka.163   
 
Left and Center 
 After its embarrassing defeat in the 2005 election, SLD remained in a weakened 
state in 2007.  In a desperate attempt to return to parliament in 2007, the SLD forged an 
electoral bloc with SdPl and PD called Left and Center (LiD).  The bloc was based on 
“issues of civil rights, the neutrality of the state, equality between the sexes and European 
integration.”164  The Left’s candidate for prime minister was former president Aleksander 
Kwasniewski.  Kwasniewski had once been the most popular politician on the Left, but 
now proved to be something of an embarrassment, allegedly appearing inebriated in a  
televised speech on more than one occasion during the campaign.165  
 
Civic Platform 
 Voter dissatisfaction with PiS and overall weakness on the Left gave an advantage 
to PO in the 2007 elections.  According to Gavin Rae, “The weakness of the left […] 
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meant that PO could attract the support of the liberal electorate who were concerned with 
the creeping authoritarianism of the PiS government.”166  In addition, PO managed to 
overcome the 2005 label of their party as “anti-Solidarity” in the 2007 election by 
arguing that they could be two things at once by having a “liberal economic policy and a 
Solidaristic social policy.”167  By building a stronger campaign platform and using 
popular disapproval of the reigning PiS government to its advantage, PO was able to gain 
a higher percentage of the vote in the 2007 parliamentary elections than any party had 
been able to after 1989.    
 
The 2007 Election Results 
 According to Rae, “The 2007 parliamentary elections became a plebiscite on 
whether the country wanted to continue along the course set out by PiS, and the answer 
given was a definitive no.”168  PO won over PiS by ten percentage points in the Sejm and 
earned over 20 more seats in the Senate. 
Table 14:  2007 Parliamentary Election Results for the Sejm 
Party % of Vote Total Seats % of Seats 
Civic Platform (PO) 41.5% 209 45.4% 
Law and Justice (PiS) 32.1% 166 36.1% 
Left and Democrats (LiD) 13.2% 53169 11.5% 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.9% 31 6.7% 
German Minority 0.2% 1 0.2% 
Self-Defense (SO) 1.5% - - 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 1.3% - - 
Source: Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza170 
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Table 15: 2007 Parliamentary Election Results for the Senate 
Party Total Seats 
Civic Platform (PO) 60 
Law and Justice (PiS) 39 
Committee for Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 1 
Source:  Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza171 
 
Only four parties entered parliament in 2007, compared to seven parties in 2005.  Even 
though PiS lost many votes in 2007, it gained much of the votes from LPR and SO, who 
both failed to achieve the 5% threshold for parliament entry.172   
Despite their best efforts, LiD only managed to gain 13% of the vote in 2007, 
which was amazingly 5% less than the combined percentages of the vote that all left-
liberal parties earned in the 2005 parliamentary elections.  The Left has been dealt two 
considerable blows by the last two elections.  Some, like Aleks Szczerbiak believe that 
the Left has exhausted the usefulness of its staple social issue of reducing the role of the 
Church in Poland:    
…given that many of the concerns about excessive Church influence on Poland 
around which the secular left mobilized in the early 1990s had receded, the social 
base for a liberal-cultural left was felt to be too narrow to sustain a major party in 
a socially and culturally conservative country such as Poland.173  
 
In addition, its usual economic campaign of more progressive taxation and welfare 
programs is now championed by several parties, including to some extent PiS.  The Left 
today in Poland remains weaker than ever, and drastic changes to their strategic program 
are necessary before they can regain their constituency.174 
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The fate of the Right after this election remains uncertain as well.  PiS, LPR, and 
SO, who are generally considered to be icons of the Polish Right, suffered significant 
losses in support in the 2007 election.  Rae points out that one reason for PO’s advantage 
was that PiS’s traditional demographic – rural voters – turned out in smaller numbers 
(40% turnout in 2007) than PO’s usual constituency of urban voters.175  Szczerbiak 
theorizes that PiS’s base was unmotivated to vote in an election where their issues, 
religious or conservative social issues, were overshadowed by economic issues.   
In addition, lustration – usually a core issue of the Polish Right – was less 
prevalent in this election.  During the 2007 campaign the Institute of National Memory 
(IPN) decided not to publicize a new list of public figures who were suspected of being 
collaborators with and those whom were under the surveillance of the former communist 
secret police.  Even though “the first group of names of those spied upon included the 
president, the prime minister and speakers of both houses of parliament,” the IPN decided 
to suppress the publication of the list “because they wanted to avoid appearing like they 
were trying to influence the election’s outcome.”176  The decreasing importance of 
lustration in Polish politics is a positive sign, as the process had been transformed by its 
proponents (usually on the Right) from a useful tool of decommunization to a political 
weapon that could be used selectively against their opponents.   
 
Aftermath of the 2007 elections 
 After winning over 40% of the vote, PO formed a coalition government with the 
Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL), which was in the process of recasting itself as a Christian 
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Democratic party under the leadership of Waldermar Pawlak.177  The new government 
has faced multiple challenges, many of which are lingering problems from the last ruling 
coalition in parliament.  After the 2007 election, “the PO government, during the first two 
months of its existence, has faced a wave of protests and strikes by workers including 
miners, teachers, nurses and customs officers.”178  The major headache of the PO 
government has been the decaying health care system that has lately fallen into debt and 
“the government’s response to this has been to propose a set of measures that amounts to 
a marketization and partial privatization of the health service.”179  I will remind you that 
much of PO’s support came from those anxious to vote against PiS rather than for PO, 
and as such there is a significant proportion of PO’s constituency with anti-liberal 
economic positions.   As such, any hints that PO planned to privatize health care have 
been met with fierce resistance by the population, as Rae explains: 
The principle of free health care and education was written into the new Polish 
constitution in 1997, with over 85 percent of the country’s population believing 
that the state should provide free and comprehensive social services…180   
 
Tusk has made tremendous strides in altering his party’s policy to appeal to his newfound 
electorate.  In an effort to pacify some of his right-wing constituents (who may reject 
some of Tusk’s more liberal economic policies), Tusk has made an effort to become more 
conservative socially.  While PO had previously criticized PiS’s close association with 
religious radicals, such as those behind the radical Radio Maryja radio station, now Tusk 
is allowing its Catholic base to have more influence over his policies.  For example, 
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“…Donald Tusk has, under pressure from the Catholic Church, refused to sign the 
European declaration of human rights and backed down from supporting state funding for 
in vitro fertilization treatment.”181    According to Szczerbiak, PO’s attempts to woo 
social conservatives are the only reason an economically liberal party made it this far in 
Polish politics in the first place.182 
PO has had difficulty in advancing its agenda not only because of popular 
resistance, but also because of difficulty from within the government itself.  Even though 
PO’s Tusk is now prime minister and the PO/PSL coalition dominates parliament, the 
presence of PiS president Lech Kaczynski still presents an obstacle for PO’s agenda.  
Kaczynski remains openly hostile towards Tusk and PO, and is quoted as saying:   
Today in power, under different guises, is an integrated formation of hard liberals 
from the old KLD.  They talk of their alleged [Solidarity] past.  Some of course 
participated in the underground movement but in truth they were not from 
[Solidarity].183   
 
Rae concludes, “It is therefore possible that there could be a political stalemate, with the 
President blocking the government’s legislative program.”184  Kaczynski’s antagonism 
may be to PO’s benefit if Kaczynski’s popularity continues to fall.  If PO can manage to 
maintain its current level of support with the added obstacle of a hostile president in 
office there is a good chance that the party will do well in the next election. 
 
Conclusions 
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 The most important result of the 2007 election was the defeat of the post-
communist/post-Solidarity divide as a defining cleavage in Poland’s party politics.  Now 
both sides of Poland’s political spectrum feature parties with roots in Solidarity.  In 
Szczerbiak’s words: 
Not only did the two main parties, as in 2005, emerge from the Solidarity 
tradition, but even the Democratic Left Alliance finally managed to transcend the 
‘historic divide’ by joining forces with the Democrats, a party that contained 
many well-known figures from the Solidarity movement.185   
 
The result of this was that the axis of competition between Left and Right shifted away 
from historical rivalries, and for the first time shifted towards “hard issues” like economic 
reform and healthcare.  In addition, the weakness of the Left has forced the Polish Right 
to compete against other right-wing parties, which has resulted in right-wing parties 
defining themselves better ideologically and stabilizing their party platforms.  In addition 
the two main parties of the Right – PO and PiS – have been forced to moderate their 
platforms in an attempt to gain and retain voters.  Euroskepticism and lustration were 
nearly absent from the 2007 campaign, and the radical LPR and SO parties received 
barely over 1% each of the vote, barring them from entry into parliament.  Both 
Kaczynski and Tusk have moderated their platforms in an attempt to appeal to a broader 
electorate.  While the absence of any strong left-wing voice in parliament or the 
government is a cause for concern, the absence of radical parties in parliament is a 
positive step forward for Polish democracy.
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Conclusion 
 In this paper I have presented the unusual case of the Polish Right, which failed to 
create strong, stable parties despite favorable pre-conditions such as a strong anti-
communist opposition movement and the predominance of the Catholic Church.  Though 
Solidarity excelled at motivating citizens as oppositionist, its weaknesses as a political 
party failed to motivate citizens as voters.  Solidarity was made up of many diverse 
viewpoints and incompatible personalities, prompting Solidarity-successor parties of the 
Right to avoid traditional party platforms constructed on ideological positions and instead 
to promote broad campaigns constructed from appeals to the historical rivalry between 
the Communist party and Solidarity.  With nothing more than common lineage to unite 
them, broad electoral blocs like Solidarity Electoral Action suffered from a lack of 
cohesive ideology, clashing leaders, and eventually fragmentation.  It was only when 
parties of the Right were able to change their strategy of alluding to historic divisions to 
one of creating an identity based on ideological positions that right-wing parties were 
able to stabilize themselves and succeed electorally.  The 2005 election proved just such 
an opportunity, as the exclusion of any Left candidate forced the two right-wing parties 
PiS and PO to compete with one another and cement their political identities.  By the 
2007 election, Polish party politics was further removed from the post-communist/post-
Solidarity divide because parties on either side of the political spectrum had roots in 
Solidarity.  In addition, campaign issues had moved from historically charged ones such 
as lustration and the role of the Catholic Church to “hard issues” such as the economy or
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health care.  All parties have been forced to moderate their platforms in an attempt to 
gain new voters.  While the spectrum seems weighted on the Right side due to the large 
presence of PiS and PO, the radical fringe such as LPR and SO has been eliminated.  
While the Left is in a weakened position now, I predict that it will return in the next 
election with a reinvigorated base and that its return will force Poland’s Right to choose 
between PiS and PO as its representative.  Unless economic liberalism, a mainstay of 
PO’s platform, gains in popularity in Poland, I predict that a more socially moderate PiS 
could make a come-back under new leadership.  However, the unpopularity of the 
Kaczynski twins’ legacy could ensure that the PiS party is voted out of Polish politics for 
good.  Without more data it is impossible for me to speculate, but I can say with some 
confidence that both parties cannot last for long while the other is still strong. 
Poland’s political party system has made enormous progress in the past two 
decades, from an erratic spectrum of dozens of parties competing on the basis of 
historical rivalries to a stable system of a handful of parties that create platforms based on 
economic and social issues.  While the political parties of the early 1990s were niche, 
today’s parties seek to broaden their platform and attract a larger section of the electorate. 
Poland’s Right, in particular, has evolved from the surprisingly weak and fragmented 
successors of Solidarity to two relatively stable mass parties.  I am confident that the 
present state of Polish political party competition is by no means static, and that Poland’s 
Right will undergo a number of changes before it reaches stability.  However I 
hypothesize that the abandonment of historic rivalry as a campaign strategy will allow 
Poland’s party system to form more naturally along ideological lines and allow Poland 
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itself to confront its communist past in a non-political way more conducive to the 
fortification of Poland’s democracy.
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Appendix A:  Table of Major Party Name Abbreviations and Party Affiliation 
Party Name Abbreviation Affiliation 
Solidarity Electoral Action AWS Right 
Liberal Democratic Congress KLD Center-Left / Center-Right 
League of Polish Families LPR Far Right 
Center Alliance PC Right 
Democratic Party PD Center-Left 
Law and Justice PiS Far Right 
Civic Platform PO Center-Right 
Polish Peasants Party PSL Left 
United Polish Workers Party 
(Communist Party of Poland) 
 
PZPR Far Left 
Movement for the Republic RdR Far Right 
Social Democracy of Poland SdPl Left 
Democratic Left Alliance SLD Left 
Self-Defense (of the 
Republic of Poland) 
 
SO 
(SRP) 
Far Left / Far Right 
Democratic Union UD Center-Left 
Union of Labor UP Left 
Freedom Union UW Left 
Solidarity none Right 
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Appendix B:  Glossary of Important Names 
Last Name First Name Ideology Parties About 
Balcerowicz Leszek Center-Left UW Architect of the 
“Balcerowicz Plan” that 
introduced shock therapy to 
Poland in 1990.  Was Leader 
of the Freedom Union party. 
Belka Marek Center-Left SLD, PD Prime minister from 2004-
2005 under President 
Kwasniewski.  He later 
joined the Democratic Party. 
Borowski Marek Left SLD, SdPl Former leader of the SLD 
and founder of the Social 
Democracy of Poland party.  
He was a presidential 
candidate in the 2005 
election. 
Buzek Jerzy Center-Right AWS, PO Prime minister from 1997-
2001 under President 
Kwasniewski.  He is 
currently a representative of 
the Civic Platform party in 
the EU Parliament. 
Cimoszewicz Wlodzimierz Left SLD Prime minister from 1996-
1997 under President 
Kwasniewski.  He was a 
presidential candidate in the 
1990 and 2005 elections. 
Giertych Maciej Far Right LPR Father of Roman Giertych 
and current member of the 
EU Parliament representing 
the League of Polish 
Families Party.  He was a 
presidential candidate in the 
2005 election. 
Giertych Roman Far Right LPR Son of Maciej Giertych and 
current leader of the League 
of Polish Families Party. 
Jaruzelski Wojciech Left / Far 
Left 
PZPR Former First Secretary of the 
communist Polish Worker's 
Party and Polish president 
from 1989-1990. 
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Kaczynski Jaroslaw Right AWS, PiS Co-founder of the Law and 
Justice party along with his 
twin brother (and current 
president) Lech Kaczysnki.  
Jaroslaw served as prime 
minister from 2006-2007 
under President Lech 
Kaczysnki. 
Kaczysnki Lech Right AWS, PiS Current president of Poland, 
he assumed office in 2005.  
He and his brother Jaroslaw 
are co-founders of the Law 
and Justice party. 
Krzaklewski Marian Right AWS Leader of the Solidarity trade 
union and the Solidarity 
Electoral Action coalition in 
the mid-1990s.  He was a 
candidate for president in 
2001. 
Kwasniewski Aleksander Left SLD Co-founder of the 
Democratic Left Alliance 
and Polish president from 
1995-2005. 
Lepper Andrzej Far Left / Far 
Right 
SO Founder and current leader 
of the radical populist Self-
Defense Party.  He served as 
Deputy Prime Minister in 
2006 after his party entered a 
coalition with the ruling PiS 
party. 
Marcinkiewicz Kazimierz Right PiS Prime minister from 2005-
2006 under President 
Kaczysnki. 
Mazowiecki Tadeusz Center-Right 
/ Center-Left 
Solidarity, 
UW, PD 
Prime minister from 1989-
1991 under Presidents 
Jaruzelski and Walesa.  He 
later joined the Freedom 
Union then the Democratic 
Party. 
Miller Leszek Left SLD Prime minister from 2001-
2004 under President 
Kwasniewski.  
Olechowski Andrzej Center-Right PO Co-founder of the Civic 
Platform party and 
independent presidential 
candidate in the 2000 
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election. 
Oleksy Jozef Left SLD Prime minister from 1995-
1996, he resigned due to 
scandal. 
Olszewski Jan Right / Far 
Right 
PC, LPR Prime minster from 1991-
1992 under President 
Walesa.  He was a 
presidential candidate in the 
1995 election. 
Pawlak Waldemar Center-Left PSL Was prime minister briefly in 
1992 under President Walesa 
and again from 1993-1995.  
He is currently serving as 
Deputy Prime Minister under 
PM Tusk. 
Tusk Donald Center-Right KLD, 
UW, PO 
Founder of the economically 
liberal Civic Platform party, 
he is currently serving as 
Prime Minister under 
President Kaczynski. 
Walesa Lech Right Solidarity, 
PC, AWS 
Former leader of the 
Solidarity opposition 
movement, Walesa was a 
founding member of the 
Center Agreement and the 
Solidarity Electoral Action 
parties.  He served as 
president from 1990-1995. 
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